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Introduction 
Natural  resource  economists  have  addressed  the  economic  efficiency 
of  expenditures  on wildfire  mitigation  for  nearly  a  century  (Gorte  and 
Gorte 1979). Beginning with the work of Sparhawk (1925), the theory of 
efficient wildfire mitigation developed along conceptual lines drawn from 
neoclassical economics. The objective of the traditional least-cost-plus-loss 
model is  to minimize the sum of ex ante expenditures on fire  prevention 
(pre-suppression),  the costs  of fire  suppression, and the ex post costs  of 
economic damages. In the closely related benefit/cost model, the objective 
is  to  maximize  the  sum  of  damages  avoided  (the  benefits)  minus  pre-
suppression and suppression costs.  Both models  assume that an increase 
in pre-suppression expenditures decreases suppression costs and economic 
damages (Figure 1). 
A major obstacle impeding the empirical application of the theoretical 
model  is  that  the  specific  functional  relationship  between  costs  and 
economic losses (or damages avoided) is generally unknown. This empirical 
problem  arises  because  wildfires  are  dangerous,  complex  phenomena 
and  experimental control plots,  replicating the critical variables existing 
on burned areas, are almost never available. Thus, it has been extremely 
difficult  to estimate what would have  happened on an actual wildfire  if 
pre-suppression and suppression expenditures had been applied at lower 
or higher levels. Empirical applications of the theoretical model have relied 
on other approaches such as  simulation  (Bellinger  et  al.  1983  ).  Despite 
this limitation, the theoretical model has been extended to other problems 
in  forest  management, such as  forest  insect control (Herrick  1981 ),  and 
theoretical  refinements continue to be  advocated (Donovan and Rideout 
2003). 
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In this chapter, we examine a second, previously overlooked limitation 
with traditional microeconomic models of wildfire mitigation. This problem 
concerns  the  economic  behavior of forest  landowners  and others  living 
within forested areas referred to as  the wildland-urban interface. Because 
the  endpoint of the traditional economic model of wildfire  mitigation is 
the value of timber protected (or lost), and because the frame of reference 
for  the  analysis  is  public  forestland,  the  behavior  of private  forestland 
owners in response to wildfire-mitigation incentives has not been adequately 
addressed. 
The rapid escalation of wildfire-suppression costs and financial damages 
over the past several years led to the National Fire Plan. The major change 
in federal wildland fire policy reflected in the plan was a shift from a reactive 
to a proactive approach that emphasizes community-based actions to reduce 
wildland fires  (National Fire Plan 2001  ).  Given this shift in emphasis, it 
is  critical to understand the economic incentives faced  by individuals and 
communities when they are asked to undertake wildfire-mitigation activities. 
More precisely, we argue that insurance compensation, disaster relief, and 
wildfire  suppression  reduce  the  incentives  of homeowners  to  undertake 
individual or collective actions to mitigate wildfires (the leftward pointing 
arrows in Figure 1 ),  and that the issue of who should pay for restoration 
of  capital  losses  (private  insurance,  government-subsidized  insurance, 
government  disaster  relief)  does  not  enter  the  traditional  model.  These 
limitations need to be addressed. 
To  set  the  context for  the  remainder of the chapter,  we first  provide 
a  historic overview of the development of market (insurance)  and social 
(disaster assistance) responses to natural hazards. Next, we present evidence 
on the trends in costs and losses from wildfire over the past several decades. 
This  evidence  provides  the  motivation  for  the  ensuing  discussion  of 
macroeconomic factors that have influenced the trends in costs and losses, 
as well as emerging equity impacts (who pays for economic losses). We finish 
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Development of  Social and Market Responses to Natural 
Hazards 
Since  antiquity,  humans  have  responded  to  natural  hazards  by  creating 
cooperative arrangements to buffer themselves  from losses  (Kates  1971, 
McCall  1987).  Oliver-Smith  (1996)  describes  how people  living  in  pre-
industrial society adapted their behavior to natural disturbance patterns 
and developed social structures that increased their probability of survival. 
For example, traditional pastoralists in Africa made rational adaptations 
to  cyclical  droughts  by  creating  "protective"  social  groups,  engaging  in 
livestock transfers with members of their group, and migrating with their 
herds (McCabe 1988). The transfer of livestock from members of the group 
with abundant cattle to those suffering livestock losses represents a primitive 
form of social insurance. 
Formal markets for property insurance developed after the Great Fire of 
London in 1666, which destroyed about 80% of the city (Kovacs 2001). 
Property insurance works by creating a  pool of contributions, known as 
"premia," from members, who can be compensated for contracted losses 
by  the funds collected. This scheme works best where risks are randomly 
and  independently  distributed  across  members  of the  pool,  and  where 
annual  losses  to  individual  members  are  large  relative  to  their  assets, 
but collective losses are small relative to the size  of the pool. The law of 
large numbers guarantees that the annual variation in average losses will 
decrease as the number of members of the pool increases, thus providing the 
insurance company with considerable control over annual payouts. Insurers 
realized from the Great Fire of London that contagion posed a threat to the 
insurability conditions, and thus required implementation of risk-reduction 
measures, such as  improved  building codes and close proximity to a  fire 
brigade, in order to join the pool (Pyne 2001). 
Natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, floods,  and earthquakes have 
historically caused problems for the insurance industry because these events 
damage many or most properties within a geographical area. If risks are 
spatially correlated, insurance companies need to raise market rates above 
those that are actuarially fair in order to cover the "social risk" (Hirshleifer 
and  Riley  1979).  Under these  conditions,  consumers may decide  not to 
purchase insurance because of budget constraints or the belief that "it can't 
happen to me" (Palm 2003  ).  Where coverage is  less than complete, some 
People remain financially exposed to natural disasters.  . 
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th  d  ·  to provide disaster  an complete, the federal government has steppe  m  .  .  . 
I. f  ·  f  disaster legtslatton m  re Ie  .  Although  Congress  passed the first  ptece  o 146  Socioeconomic and Institutional Factors 
1803,  comprehensive  (as  distinct  from  disaster-specific)  legislation  was 
not forthcoming  until  the  Disaster Relief Act  of 1950. During the  past 
half-century,  public  attitudes toward natural disasters  have  shifted  from 
fatalistic-disasters are a part of nature that is  accepted as part of life-to 
viewing disaster assistance as  an entitlement (Barnett 1999). This change 
is  evidenced by the fact that the federal government provided only 1% of 
disaster relief in 1953 but more than 70% by the mid-1970s (Clary 1985). 
In a bad wildfire year, the need for federal disaster assistance can be great. 
The California wildfires of 2003 burned over 750,000 acres and destroyed 
over 3,600 homes. Insured losses from these wildfires were close to $2 billion 
(Insurance Information Institute 2005). Because the demand for recovery 
funds was not completely met by private insurance, the federal government 
also provided over $483 million in disaster assistance, an amount equal to 
roughly 25% of the insured losses  (California Fires  Coordination Group 
2004  ).  Most of this federal relief was in the form of low-interest loans that 
the Small Business Administration provided.
1 
An  increased  level  of concern  with the  escalation  in  federal  disaster 
assistance has caused policymakers to emphasize the linkage  between ex 
post disaster assistance and ex ante community mitigation activities. This 
shift  in  policy  is  characterized  by  the  provisions  of the  National  Flood 
Insurance Act  of 1968, which requires  residents  of special  flood-hazard 
areas to purchase flood insurance if financing for the property comes from 
a federal loan or grant or if funds come from an institution that is  insured 
by the federal  government (Palm 2003  ).  Provision of flood  insurance by 
the federal government is contingent upon communities undertaking actions 
that will mitigate potential flood damages. 
Rising financial costs of  climate-and weather-related disasters have caused 
unprecedented insurance industry losses and calls for a greater federal role 
in financing catastrophic relief (Nutter 2002). Insurance companies protect 
themselves from catastrophic losses, to some degree, by purchasing insurance 
from re-insurance companies. The re-insurance market attempts to diversify 
risks from natural catastrophes by pooling risks over large geographic areas, 
often including international markets. But the potential losses from natural 
hazards are often so  large that the private sector,  even supported by  the 
re-insurance industry, has not been willing to shoulder the entire burden. 
Hence, government-led quasi-private insurance strategies have emerged as 
stop-gap measures, at the state and federal levels. Some states have created 
re-insurance pools for hurricane damage ("wind pools") that help keep rates 
lower in the private market. Another strategy is for states to create residual 
markets for homeowners in hurricane- or earthquake-prone locations who 
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Floods cause more damage than any other natural hazard in the U.S. and 
account for the highest levels  of federal  disaster assistance in most years 
(Palm 2003  ).  Within the market for private insurance, most insured losses 
from  natural  disasters  result  from  hurricanes  (33%  of total),  tornadoes 
(32%  of total),  and earthquakes  (  13%) (Insurance Information Institute 
2005). Wildfires have only accounted for about 3% of total insured losses 
from natural hazards in the  United States.  Although typical homeowner 
fire-insurance  policies cover losses from wildfires, concern over the rapid 
rise in insured losses due to wildfires has caused the insurance industry to 
require wildfire-mitigation activities as a precondition for insurance policies 
in some regions in California and the Southwest that are at especially high 
risk of wildfire losses. 
Trends in Costs and Losses from Wildfires 
Wildfire  data  obtained from the National Interagency Fire Center (2004) 
were plotted and a polynomial trend was fitted to the data (Figure 2). The 
data reveal an increasing trend in total acres burned by wildfire from 1980 
to 2003. This rise follows a decreasing trend in total acres burned from 1960 
to roughly 1980. The pattern has been partially attributed to a warming 
trend in the western U.S., causing the snowpack to melt earlier in the spring, 
and resulting in more severe drought conditions over much of the summer. 
Continued drought conditions in the western U.S.  are anticipated for  the 
foreseeable future (Strategic Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs 2004). 
The upswing in the number of acres burned by wildfires is  reflected in 
the  trend in  federal  wildfire-suppression cost,  adjusted  for  inflation  (SU 
cost, Figure 2), particularly since 19822. In 1988, wildfire-suppression costs 
in the U.S.  exceeded $1  billion for the first time. Since the year 2000, the 
billion-dollar level has been exceeded each year. 
Although reliable information on the total financial damages from natural 
hazards is difficult to obtain, data are available on insured losses (Insurance 
Information Institute 2005). During the 1970s and 1980s, insured losses 
from catastrophic wildfires rarely exceeded $100 million (Table 1 ). However, 
the  1991  wildfires  in  Oakland Hills,  California,  destroyed  nearly  3,200 
homes (California Fires Coordination Group 2004) and caused about $2.3 
billion in  insured losses.  This was the twentieth-most-costly insured loss 
ever recorded worldwide (Swiss Re 2004). 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, insured losses from wildfires have dramatically 
increased and most catastrophic wildfires occurred in southern California, 
an  area  experiencing  rapid  population  growth  and  escalating  property 
values. This period of escalation in insured losses coincides with the period 148  Socioeconomic and Institutional Factors 
Figure 2.  U.S.  wildfire 
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wildfire suppression 
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of escalation in wildfire-suppression expenditures, providing evidence that 
overall economic costs (the sum of costs plus losses) are also increasing. 
Factors Influencing Increased Costs and Losses from 
Natural Disasters 
We  identify  several  micro- and  macroeconomic  factors  that  have 
contributed  to  the  escalation  in  costs  and  losses  resulting  from  natural 
hazards, including wildfires. Emerging trends in macroeconomic variables 
(migration, wealth, income, and housing prices) have been compounded by 
underlying microeconomic behaviors that reflect the incentives that people 
face when making risk-mitigation decisions. On the other hand, providing 
timely,  believable information about natural-hazard risk helps individuals 
make rational economic decisions that reduce values  at risk.  We  discuss 
each of these factors in turn. 
Migration 
The escalation in insured losses from natural events might suggest that the 
natural world is becoming increasingly violent. However, Changnon (2003) 
shows that the increasing trend of insured losses from catastrophic weather 
events  disappears when loss  data are  adjusted for  population levels  and 
inflation. This leads him to conclude that "Human actions have in many 
ways caused the economic and environmental losses from natural disasters 
to become greater than years ago" (p. 287). If  more people are migrating to 
areas that are at risk of natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, 
and wildfires, and if these people are transferring and creating more wealth 
in these areas, then we would expect that economic losses would likewise 
increase, even if the rate of natural disasters is constant. Efficient and Equitable Design of  Wildfire Mitigation Programs  149 
Table 1. Insured losses from catastrophic wildfires in the 
u.s., 1970-2003. 
Year  Location  Insured losses 
($millions 2003) 
2003  San Diego and San Bernardino Counties, CA  2,035 
2002  Rodeo-Chedeski Complex, AZ  123 
2000  Cerro Grande, NM  150 
1993  Los Angeles and Orange Counties, CA  923 
1991  Oakland and Alameda Counties, CA  2,297 
1990  Santa Barbara County, CA  373 
1985  Florida  56 
1982  Los Angeles, Ventura, and Orange Counties, CA  31 
1980  Several Counties, Southern CA  132 
1979  Hollywood Hills, CA  13 
1978  Los Angeles and Ventura Counties, CA  42 
1977  Santa Barbara, Montecito, CA  61 
1970  Oakland-Berkley Hills, CA  118 
Source: Insurance Information Institute 2005 
Of particular  relevance  in  the  overall  trend  in  losses  due  to  natural 
disasters has been the migration to coastal areas, particularly in the southern 
and southeastern states, which are particularly prone to hurricanes. The 
National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric  Administration  reports  that  U.S. 
coastal areas experienced a population increase of 41% from 1960 to 1990, 
demonstrating a growth rate 3% higher than the nation as a whole (Ross 
&  Lott 2003; U.S.  Census Bureau 2004a)3. In total, 53% of the national 
population resides  in coastal counties that account for  17% of the U.S. 
landmass (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1998). 
Migration trends also appear to influence the escalation of economic costs 
and losses  attributable to wildfires.  Recent studies have shown that rural 
population growth in the U.S. has largely resulted from the attractiveness of 
natural environments, including forested areas (Deller et a!.  2001; English 
et a!.  2000). Johnson and Beale  (1994)  reported that, during the  1990s, 
the  fastest-growing  counties  in  the  United  States  were  nonmetropolitan 
counties that were destinations for retirement-age migrants or were outdoor-
recreation centers. 
Housing prices 
A second factor contributing to the escalation in costs and losses attributable 
to natural hazards is  the trend in housing prices. A rise in the general price 
level over time-inflation-increases the price of vulnerable human capital 
as  the value  of all  goods and services  rises.  For example, from  1960 to 
2000 the general price level rose by 482% (U.S. Department of Commerce 
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Housing  price  inflation  may  be  particularly  acute  in  locations  with 
favorable environmental amenities. English et a!.  (2000) found in a  study 
of 1990 house values that the average house was worth nearly $13,000 
more  in  tourism-dependent  counties  than  in  non-tourism  counties.  The 
scarcity of real property can result in higher at-risk values, as the price for 
land and housing is  bid up in areas with desirable natural amenities.  In 
most areas, the supply of available private land is nearly fixed, constrained 
by physical features and jurisdictional rules. Against a nearly fixed supply, 
rising demand due to increases in real  wealth per capita and population 
create rapid property-value increases. Relatively rapid population growth in 
wildland-urban interface areas with attractive natural amenities combined 
with an increase in the real value of housing stock might reasonably explain 
much of the trend in increasing losses from wildfires. 
Wealth and income 
Wealth represents the accumulation of capital over time. Household wealth 
is created by savings from personal income after consumption expenditures 
and tax payments have been  deducted. During the twentieth century, the 
household savings rate in the U.S. has been relatively stable at approximately 
15-20% of disposable personal income, and the proportion of disposable 
personal  income that is  saved  for  retirement  ("life-cycle  saving")  nearly 
tripled over the same period (Lee  2001). Investments in real estate are an 
important type of wealth accumulation and, during the period from 1945 to 
1990, real-estate investments averaged about 4.4% per annum of disposable 
personal income (more than double the rate for the period 1897-1929) (Lee 
2001). In the U.S., per capita incomes, adjusted for inflation, rose by 148% 
between 1960 and 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004a, 2004b; U.S. Department 
of Commerce 2003  ).  Thus, income growth and the accumulation of wealth 
through investment in real estate have placed an increasing amount of capital 
at risk of loss from natural hazards. This problem may be particularly acute 
for retirees who have migrated to the wildland-urban interface and invested 
life-cycle savings in real estate. 
Although the overall trend in wealth has been upward in the U.S., over 
the past two decades income inequality has been increasing as well (Aghion 
eta!. 1999). Chevan and Stokes (2000) argue that this trend may be  due 
in part to the "McDonald's effect," whereby unionized, highly paid blue-
collar jobs have been replaced by non-unionized lower-paying service jobs. 
Income  inequality may  be  important in  tourism-dependent communities 
within the wildland-urban interface because the tourism sector is dependent 
on service  jobs.  Although population growth has  been rapid in  tourism-
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such communities may create different economic stresses for people within 
different economic strata. 
Natural disasters may also create poverty traps. Although the linkages 
between poverty and natural disasters have been discussed primarily in the 
context of low-income countries (e.g., Morduch 1994), Fothergill and Peek 
(2004) have argued that even in the U.S.  the poor are more vulnerable to 
natural catastrophes because of where they live  and their poorer quality 
of housing. Thus, natural disasters may be among the factors that prevent 
people living in poverty from  bettering their lives  economically.  Because 
people living below or near the poverty line, who rent or own poor-quality 
housing, are less able to afford investments in mitigation or insurance, they 
rely more heavily on governmental compensation when a disaster strikes. 
Thus, increasing income inequality could lead to increased recovery costs. 
Moral hazard 
If we wish to understand the economic rationality of actions that people 
take to protect themselves  and their property from natural hazards, we 
must  consider  the  full  range  of  incentives  and  opportunities  faced  by 
property owners. The transfer of risk from the individual to the principal 
(i.e.,  insurance company) via  insurance affects the incentives faced  by the 
individual (McCall 1987). The major factor linking protective actions of 
individuals to private insurance is known as "moral hazard." If  individuals 
who  purchase private  insurance contracts are not inclined  to undertake 
protective measures that would reduce either the probability of loss  (self-
protection) or the magnitude of loss if it did occur (self-insurance), and if 
insurance companies cannot perfectly monitor the actions of  the policyholder, 
a  moral hazard is  created for  the  insurance company  (Kotowitz  1987). 
Viewed the other way around, if insurance prices do not reflect efforts at 
self-protection or self-insurance, then individuals will not have an incentive 
to  adopt  risk-reduction  measures  (Hirshleifer  and  Riley  1979).  Ehrlich 
and Becker (1972)  showed that market insurance is  a  substitute for self-
insurance, and as the price of market insurance increases (decreases), people 
will spend more (less) on self-insurance. 
Samaritan's dilemma 
The expectation that the government  will  provide  disaster assistance  in 
the wake of a  natural disaster causes people to under-invest in protective 
measures, a phenomenon known as  "the Samaritan's dilemma." Lewis and 
Nickerson (1989)  argued that the decision  by  consumers to underinsure 
is  rational  given  the  expectation  that  the  government  will  provide 
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Kelly  and  Kleffner  (2003)  confirmed  this  and showed how government 
disaster assistance can reduce mitigation expenditures by individuals. Coate 
(1995) argued that the fundamental problem stems from the fact that the 
government cannot commit ex ante to a  fixed  level  of support should a 
disaster occur.  Experimental evidence has shown that a  disaster-recovery 
program  of financial  aid  lowers  most  forms  of wildfire  risk-mitigation 
expenditures (McKee eta!. 2004). 
These theoretical and empirical studies suggest that self-protection and 
self-insurance measures such as  those  advocated by community wildfire-
mitigation  programs  (e.g.,  reducing  vegetation  close  to  the  home  and 
using fire-resistant materials in roofs and gutters) may not be adopted by 
homeowners  for  rational  economic  reasons.  If the  government  were  to 
commit ex  ante to provide  disaster  relief  only to homeowners living  in 
communities that have implemented measures to reduce the risk of wildfire, 
then the incentives to take protective action would be increased. 
Risk information 
A basic economic tenet is that people make decisions based on the information 
that is  available  to  them. If information is  incomplete or is  of dubious 
quality, then people may rationally decide not to act on that information or 
may make seemingly irrational decisions. Uncertainty regarding the extent 
to which community-based wildfire-mitigation activities reduce wildfire risk 
may explain why some people are reluctant to invest in these activities. 
A  number  of  economic  studies  have  shown  that,  when  reliable 
information is  available regarding the risk of natural hazards, individuals 
use that information in making economic choices. Brookshire eta!. (1985) 
investigated  California housing markets in  areas subject to earthquakes. 
What these researchers discovered is  that people are willing to pay higher 
(lower) real estate prices for houses in lower (higher) earthquake risk zones. 
These authors concluded that a 1974 law passed by the state of California 
requiring earthquake risk  information be  available to consumers allowed 
individuals to self-insure by trading off risk and price. Similar results were 
reported by Troy and Romm (2004). They found that the average home 
located on floodplains across California sold for 4.2% less than comparable 
non-floodplain  homes  after  passage  of  the  California  Natural  Hazard 
Disclosure Law, but that no difference in price was found before passage of 
that law. The provision of timely, believable information about the risk of 
catastrophic events may be a critical factor in individual decisions to self-
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Discussion and Policy Implications 
Over the past two decades, the upward trend in the number of acres burned by 
wildfires has been matched by growth in wildfire-suppression costs, insured 
economic  losses,  and  disaster  assistance.  A  number  of macroeconomic 
factors  have  contributed to  the  trends  in  wildfire-suppression  costs  and 
losses within the wildland-urban interface, including in-migration to scenic 
areas, increasing wealth, and an escalation in real estate values. As greater 
wealth is placed at risk, more money is spent by the federal government to 
protect it from wildfires and provide assistance for losses. Research is clearly 
needed to systematically document and analyze the trends in population 
growth, migration, and the accumulation of capital in wildfire risk areas 
within the wildland-urban interface. 
A fundamental issue facing policy makers is the prevalent social attitude 
that the federal  government should and will  provide assistance  during a 
disaster (such as wildfire suppression) and that governmental relief will be 
forthcoming in the aftermath of a catastrophe. Although few would argue 
against the need for some level of federal disaster aid, federal assistance is 
commonly viewed as an entitlement even when those needing assistance chose 
not to invest in  insurance or mitigation measures  beforehand. Economic 
theory suggests that if property owners believed that disaster relief would not 
be forthcoming from the federal government unless effective risk-mitigation 
measures had been implemented beforehand, then their incentives for self-
protection would be enhanced. These actions may reduce the probability of 
damages, may reduce future migration to, or rebuilding in, risky locations, 
and might begin to shift the responsibility of protection from the federal 
government to individuals and neighborhoods who share the risk. Research 
is  needed to systematically evaluate the economic efficiency of mandatory 
and voluntary wildfire-mitigation programs. 
Making disaster assistance conditional on ex ante mitigation, however, 
would have severe consequences for the poor. There is evidence that natural 
disasters  are felt  more acutely by the poor than the more wealthy for  a 
variety of factors, including the likelihood that the poor live and move to 
risk-prone areas, have relatively low-quality housing, and possess less ability 
to travel the bureaucratic pathways necessary to claim disaster assistance. 
Because the poor are less able to purchase insurance or make investments in 
self-protection, they rely more heavily on federal disaster assistance to help 
them recover from natural disasters. Research into the impact of wildfires 
on people living in poverty, or close to the poverty line, is sorely needed. 
Property owners use reliable information about risk in making choices 
regarding both purchase and provision of self-insurance. If wildfire  risk 154  Socioeconomic and Institutional Factors 
factors are capitalized into property values, as has been demonstrated for 
earthquake and flood risks, then risk-adjusted property values may provide 
a degree of financial self-insurance for property owners, because they would 
have less wealth at risk. In addition, private insurance costs may be more 
affordable for  risk-adjusted property owners, again  because the value of 
the property at risk would be  lower. This can only occur if wildfire risks 
are adequately mapped in the wildland-urban interface and the information 
made readily available to consumers. 
Many  community  action  programs  aimed  at  lowering  wildfire .risk 
have been established throughout the wildland-urban interface. However, 
we would emphasize that the success of wildfire risk-reduction programs 
depends to a  large degree on understanding the economic incentives that 
people  face  when  making  risk-reduction  choices,  and  incorporating  the 
proper incentives into program implementation. 
NoTES 
1. Most, but not all, of the loans are repaid by property owners. The net present 
value (NPV) of direct federal disaster relief expenditures comprises interest rate 
subsidies and the costs of loan defaults, and these averaged 27% of the insured 
losses during the mid-1990s (Barnett 1999). Applying this average to the 2003 
California wildfires yields an estimated NPV of direct costs to the government 
of $130.4 million. It has been estimated that, during the period FY 1980-96, the 
NPV of direct costs to the federal government for all natural disasters averaged 
$535 million per year (Barnett 1999). 
2. Suppression-cost data shown in Figure 2 were obtained from the report 
published by the Strategic Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs (2004  ).  USDA 
Forest Service data include expenditures for initial attack and suppression, 
whereas those for Department of Interior  agencies only include suppression 
expenditures. Because Department of Interior data were only reported 
beginning in 1985, estimates were back-cast to 1970 based on the ratio of DOl 
to Forest Service expenditures during the period 1985-2003. 
3. The total U.S. population increased from 181  million to 249 million between 
1960 and 1990 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004a); in 2000, it was estimated at 282 
million (U.S. Census Bureau 2004b). 
4. It should be recognized that published reports of loss-value trends sometimes do 
not adjust for general price inflation. 
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